## Automatic Software Error Finding: Approaches and Tradeoffs (candidacy exam)

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## PEOPLE AFFECTED (AT LEAST) 3,683,212,665

## SOFTWARE FAIL WATCH STHEDITION 2017




TRICENTIS

# Software errors: Find them before they find you!


**Reviewed approaches** 

- Test input generation
- Statistical error detection


#### **Papers from three areas**



#### Symbolic execution & fuzzing




## Symbolic execution 101



#### Introduced in EFFIGY[1](1976)

- Execute on symbolic inputs
- Summarize classes of inputs

#### **Classic symbolic vs concolic execution**



## **Classic symbolic vs concolic execution**

#### Classic symbolic execution

- Maintain symbolic state
- Fork symbolic execution on branches
- Use solver
  - $\circ~\mbox{Branch}$  feasibility

#### Implemented in EXE [2](2006)

#### **Concolic execution**

- Maintain **conc**rete & symb**olic** state
- Run concrete execution on taken branches
- Use solver
  - Cover not-taken branches

➤ Implemented in DART [12](2005)

	<u>Symbolic</u> <u>state</u>	<u>Path</u> constraint	<u>Concrete</u> <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b		Random concrete values: x=1, y=1
//naughty programmer z = x*x*x;	z=a*a*a		z=1
if (z == y + 1) abort();		a*a*a != b + 1	
else exit(0);			
J			0

	<u>Symbolic</u> <u>state</u>	<u>Path</u> constraint	<u>Concrete</u> <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b		Random concrete values: x=1, y=1
//naughty programmer z = x*x*x;	z=a*a*a		z=1
if $(z = y + 1)$	Path constrair	nt: (a*a*a != b + 1)	
abort();	Cannot solve		
else			
<b>exit(0)</b> ;			
5			

	Symbolic state	<u>Path</u> constraint	<u>Concrete</u> <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b		Random concrete values: x=1, y=1
<pre>//naughty programmer z = x*x*x;</pre>	z=a*a*a		z=1
<pre>if (z == y + 1)</pre>	Path constrain Cannot solve Simplify: a = 1	nt: (a*a*a != b + 1) ↔ 1 != b + 1	
}			

		Path <u>Concrete</u> straint <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b	New concrete values: x=1, y=0
//naughty programmer z = x*x*x;	z=a*a*a	z=1
<pre>if (z == y + 1)</pre>	Path constraint: (a*a* Cannot solve Simplify: $a = 1 \leftrightarrow 1 !=$ Negate & solve: $b = 0$	= b + 1


	<u>Symbolic</u> <u>state</u>	<u>Path</u> constraint	<u>Concrete</u> <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b		New concrete variables: x=1, y=0
<pre>//naughty programmer z = x*x*x;</pre>	z=a*a*a		z=1
<pre>if (z == y + 1)</pre>		a*a*a == b + ′	1
-	J		10

	<u>Symbolic</u> <u>state</u>	<u>Path</u> constraint	<u>Concrete</u> <u>state</u>
void test_me(int x, int y){	Create symbolic variables: x=a, y=b		New concrete variables: x=1, y=0
//naughty programmer z = <b>syscall(x)</b>	z=a*a*a		z=1
if (z == y + 1) abort();		a*a*a == b + 1	
else exit(0);			14

## **Classic symbolic execution**




- Handling complex constraints
- Environment problem
- $\succ$  Path explosion




## **Concolic execution**

#### What do we gain?

- Executions run to completion
- > Path explosion still a problem




#### **Comparative view**



Coverage	Number of COREUTILS tools	Avg. #ELOC
100%	16	3307
90-100%	38	3958
80-90%	22	5013


COREUTILS tools statement coverage KLEE [3]




Арр	Mean number of instructions	#Test cases
Media	54M	2,266
Office	923M	3,008


Statistics from SAGE[19]

## **Classic symbolic vs concolic execution**




System	Туре	What's new?
EXE[2]	Symbolic	Pioneer symbolic execution engine
KLEE[3]	Symbolic	Models environment
UC-KLEE[9]	Symbolic	Checks individual functions
CLOUD9[7]	Symbolic	Parallelization of symbolic execution
DART[12]	Concolic	Pioneer concolic execution engine
CUTE[13]	Concolic	Adds symbolic with pointers
PEX[5]	Concolic	Concolic execution in .NET
SAGE[19]	Concolic	Generational search on deep paths
CREST[15]	Hybrid	Concolic exec. & random testing
VERISOFT[8]	Hybrid	Concolic exec. & state merging
S2E[6]	Hybrid	Symbolic exec. w/ virtualization





#### Fuzzing: mutation-based vs grammar-based



## **Mutation-based fuzzing**

Seed

inputs

Add mutant

to the queue

➤ American Fuzzy Lop (AFL)[23]

branch/ edge

coverage

increased?

**Mutants** 

Execute

against

instrumented

target

#### Key points

- Coverage-guided search
- No assumptions for particular input format
  - Hard branches (e.g., magic numbers)

## **Grammar-based fuzzing**

SPIKE grammar-based fuzzer [24]

```
// Magic number -- don't fuzz
static("89504E470D0A1A0A");
...
// Fuzz next bytes
```


```
block_start("Header");
fuzzable_byte(1); // Width
```

```
block_end("Header");
```

...

#### Key points

- Use grammar to describe input formats
- Good for structured input formats
- Writing grammar is labour-intensive, manual process




➤ GLADE: Synthesizing program input grammars [25](2017)

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{input example} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} <\mathbf{a} > \mathbf{hi} < /\mathbf{a} > \\ \Rightarrow (<\mathbf{a} > \mathbf{hi} < /\mathbf{a} >)^{*} \\ \Rightarrow (<\mathbf{a} > (\mathbf{hi})^{*} < /\mathbf{a} >)^{*} \\ \Rightarrow (<\mathbf{a} > (\mathbf{hi})^{*} < /\mathbf{a} >)^{*} \\ \Rightarrow (<\mathbf{a} > (\mathbf{h+i})^{*} < /\mathbf{a} >)^{*} \\ \end{array} \right. \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{translate to CFG} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \Rightarrow & A \rightarrow (\mathbf{h+i})^{*} \\ B \rightarrow & (<\mathbf{a} > A < / \mathbf{a} >)^{*} \\ B \rightarrow & (<\mathbf{a} > A < / \mathbf{a} >)^{*} \end{array} \right. \\ \end{array} \right. \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{m} \text{erge nonterminals} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \Rightarrow & A \rightarrow (\mathbf{h+i})^{*} \\ A \rightarrow & (<\mathbf{a} > A < / \mathbf{a} >)^{*} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$

#### Key points

- Start with an input sample
- Construct increasingly general regular expressions
- Translate to Context Free Grammar
- ➤ Learning is slow

> NEUZZ: Fuzzing with Neural Program Learning [29](2018)




#### Key points


- Feed input samples and monitor taken/non-taken branches
- Use training data X,Y learn model for branching behavior
- Use model to perform gradient-guided mutations
- Unclear generalization to "never-taken" paths

Characteristics	GLADE [25]	NEUZZ [29]	SKYFIRE [27]	RL Fuzzing [28]	Learn & Fuzz [26]
Learns to model	Valid input format	Taken/non-taken branches	Valid input format	High reward mutation policy	Valid input format
Mutations	Use grammar	Use model's gradients	Use grammar and AFL	Use learnt policy	Use model's predictions
Strength	Fully blackbox	Gradient-guided mutations	Semantic validity of test cases	End-to-end RL formulation	Location-specific mutation probabilities
Weakness	Learning realistic grammars slow	Unclear generalization to unseen behaviors	Used a huge collection of input samples	Unclear quality of RL policy	Unclear benefit (production-optimized initial seeds)


#### **Dynamic program analysis**



#### **Statistical error detection**



#### **Correctness patterns**



#### **Correctness patterns**


➤ DeepBugs [31](2017)

```
var p = new Promise();
if (promises == null || promises.len == 0) {
    p.done(error, result) ?
} else {
    promises[0](error, result).then(function(res, err))
        p.done(res, err); ?
});
```

#### Key points

- Inconsistent but...which is correct?
- Most code is (hopefully) correct
- Perform transformations to create incorrect samples
- Need to come up with language-specific checkers

#### **Quality metrics**



## **Quality metrics**

#### Transfer Defect Learning [34](2013)





Fig. 1: Defect Prediction Process


#### Key points

- Code quality metrics of known defects
- Predict if new files look defective
- General metrics ↔ reusable across new targets
- ➢ File-level reports

#### **Comparative view**

System	Proxy for error detection	Source-target	Transfer learning type
DeepBugs [31]	Correctness patterns	Same	N/A
Bugs as Deviant Behaviour [30]	Correctness patterns	Same	N/A
Naturalness [32]	Quality metrics	Same	N/A
TCA+ [34]	Quality metrics	Different	Domain adaptation
Semi-supervised Defect Prediction [33]	Quality metrics	Different	Inductive transfer learning





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